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ABSTRACT
In this work we solve the problem of architecting a conceptual, near-term, cost-effective
system of systems (SoS) to respond to small boats used by terrorists to attack maritime
commerce traffic and critical shore infrastructures in the United States, by formulating the
architecting problem as an assignment problem which is then solved using the orthogonal
array experiment. Also known as the Taguchi method in quality control, the orthogonal array
experiment is efficient for this class of problems. The optimality of the resulting architecture,
called optimal cost-effective architecture, is validated against a heuristically developed
architecture and an optimal effective architecture; the latter is obtained also with the orthogo-
nal array experiment approach. The main purpose of this paper is an exploratory application
of the Taguchi method to architecting a system of systems. The principal results of the
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orthogonal array experiment method reported herein underline this successful exploratory
work in architecting a system of systems. This method can be extended to architecting other
systems of systems. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 10: 241–259, 2007
Key words: maritime threat response (MTR); small boat attack (SBA); architecture; system of
systems (SoS); orthogonal array experiment; Taguchi method
1. INTRODUCTION
A small boat attack (SBA) in U.S. waters and ports is
an attack by a single terrorist already in the U.S. who,
in an explosive small boat, blends in with recreational
boaters to get close to high-value units (HVUs) and
assaults them at high speed. An SBA is considered to
be the most likely attack in the future, because bombing
of public transportation, suicide or otherwise, is the
most common form of attack by terrorists. There have
been numerous terrorist attacks on transportation, but
only the most recent maritime incidents are noted here.
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was severely dam-
aged by the detonation of a terrorist suicide boat packed
with high explosives. Seventeen sailors were killed and
39 were wounded in the attack, and the cost of repairing
the ship was approximately $250 million [Perl and
O’Rourke, 2001]. On October 6, 2002, the French oil
tanker M/V Limburg suffered a similar attack three
nautical miles from the coast of Yemen. The attack
caused an oil spill estimated at 90,000 barrels. Both
hulls of the ship’s double-hull structure were breached
by the explosion. On April 24, 2004, three suicide boats
attempted to damage or destroy the Khawr Al Amaya
and Al Basrah Offshore Terminals, which handle 90%
of Iraqi crude oil exports, and two very large crude
carriers tied up alongside the terminals [Howland,
2004]. The attack was foiled, but the damage or loss of
the terminals would have an enormous impact on the
Iraqi economy. Finally, two separate ferry bombings in
the Philippines in 2004 and 2005 killed over 100 people
[Villanueva, 2004; Scotsman, 2005].
There is thus a need to develop a system of systems
(SoS) to respond to such terrorist threats—threats to the
U.S. that emanate from the maritime domain. We shall
call it the maritime threat response (MTR) SoS. In this
work, a conceptual, near-term, cost-effective system-
of-systems (SoS) architecture is developed to respond
specifically to small boat attacks1 in the San Francisco
Bay and to do so with minimal impact on commerce
and economic cost. By a conceptual SoS we mean a
concept, not an actual SoS; it is merely a concept
proposed in an academic project. The cost-effectiveness
measure is defined in Section 3. The near-term MTR
SoS [Sage and Cuppan, 2001] will consist of systems
that are currently in service, in development, and com-
mercial-off-the-shelf technologies or systems that
would be available and/or could be developed within
the next five years. The systems that constitute the MTR
SoS include hardware, software, and human resources,
which, as will be seen in Section 2.2, account for the
total SoS cost. The MTR SoS architecture is a fixed
system—in the sense that the systems that form the SoS
remain unchanged. It is intended to be a single, simplis-
tic SoS architecture that will be used to counter an SBA
in San Francisco Bay.
Intelligence is needed before a response is taken, and
the MTR SoS needs and makes use of intelligence. Due
to the limited scope of this work, we consider any
intelligence system such as national, service, and/or
human assets not to be a component of the MTR SoS;
that is, the boundary of the MTR SoS does not enclose
these intelligence systems, but intelligence produced by
them can be received and used by the MTR SoS. The
MTR SoS itself, however, has its own internal intelli-
gence provided to the components within the SoS
boundary; the nature of the internal intelligence will be
discussed in Section 2. For practical reasons, we also
assume an MTR SoS solution to be free from any
political and jurisdictional issues that can potentially
exist.
The San Francisco Bay area is a fitting choice for the
operational environment for the small boat attack sce-
nario. The San Francisco/Oakland major metropolitan
area (MMA) has numerous features that make it an
attractive target for terrorist attacks. The San Francisco
Bay area is heavily populated, and it attracts millions of
visitors and tourists each year. It is the second-largest
container port in California and the fourth largest in the
nation. The combined ports of San Francisco, Oakland,
and Richmond receive an average of ten foreign mer-
chant vessels daily, primarily crude oil tankers and
container ships [Young, 2005]. There are also numerous
1This focused area is a part of a major campus-wide, integrated
systems engineering and analysis (SEA) project carried out at the
Naval Postgraduate School by the academic year 2006 SEA class.
The members of this class are USN LCDR Andy Kessler, MAJ Mike
Shewfelt, LT Brian Connett, LT Chewy Chiurourman, LT Joe Oravec,
ENS Shawna Wark, and Ms. Jennifer Davis.
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points of critical infrastructure on or near the San Fran-
cisco Bay.
One of the most famous bridges in the world, the
Golden Gate Bridge, connecting San Francisco to the
Marin peninsula, is one of the nation’s premiere land-
marks. The San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge is a
vital economic connection between San Francisco and
Oakland. There are other large public transportation
systems and hubs (as expected of any MMA), including
three large airports, numerous ferries, rail lines, and
three other bridges of significant size. Any action that
would curtail or stop transportation in the San Francisco
Bay area would have significant economic impact esti-
mable in billions of dollars [Frittelli, 2005; Arnold et
al., 2006]. In addition, a large explosion, fire, or chemi-
cal cloud at the famous, heavily visited Fisherman’s
Wharf waterfront tourist area has the potential for mass
casualties and the “cinematic” and psychological ef-
fects that Al-Qaeda and other groups seek.
The San Francisco/Oakland MMA is also relatively
isolated from large military concentration areas, par-
ticularly naval assets. The two West Coast fleet concen-
tration areas are San Diego and Seattle. The main assets
for immediate maritime defense are therefore USCG
units already in the Bay area. This is not to say that
USCG assets are not capable of performing MTR mis-
sions, but rather to highlight that assistance may be
several days in arriving. Even USCG PACAREA and
District 11 assets are spread from the Oregon to Mexi-
can borders.
Countering a small boat attack in the San Francisco
Bay with a high density of recreational and commercial
traffic (a USCG estimate of 300 to 400 vessels on
average in a 24-h period) is a great challenge. A suc-
cessful small boat attack on a densely packed passenger
ferry would certainly cause extensive casualties and
make emergency response and casualty treatment much
more difficult than would a similar attack on a land-
based target. A significant oil spill from a large crude
oil tanker damaged in a successful small boat attack
could cause environmental damage in the large offshore
marine sanctuary area and incur significant cleanup
costs. The SBA mission2 considered in this work in-
volves protecting five oil tankers inbound to the San
Francisco Bay area, eight ferries operating on five dif-
ferent routes in the Francisco Bay, and five critical
infrastructures such as oil offload terminals, pipelines,
power facilities, etc. from an attacker who uses a 30-
foot civilian speedboat with a top speed of 40 knots,
loaded with 1000 pounds of conventional explosives.
The five oil tankers arrive daily at times equally spaced,
while the ferries operate 12 h daily.
The focus of this paper is the orthogonal array ex-
periment methodology employed to develop MTR SoS
architectures. The use of specially constructed tables
known as orthogonal arrays for designing robust prod-
ucts and processes was originally espoused by G.
Taguchi in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. Taguchi
[1978, 1993], Taguchi and Wu [1980], and Roy [1990]
contain a detailed description of the Taguchi method. It
has been used increasingly in many American indus-
tries, such as AT&T, ITT, Xerox, and Ford. Emphati-
cally, the Taguchi method has been successfully used in
product quality control. Parenthetically, the orthogonal
array experiment and the Taguchi method are synony-
mous and used interchangeably in this paper.
In Huynh [1997] the Taguchi method was extended
to solving a specific assignment problem—optimal al-
location of files in a distributed computer network. This
novel application of the Taguchi method then continued
with solving the problem of optimal allocation of band-
width in a satellite communication network [Huynh and
Gillen, 2001]. In the present work we again extend the
Taguchi method to architecting an MTR SoS. Specifi-
cally, we employ the Taguchi method to generate both
an optimal cost-effective SoS architecture and an opti-
mal effective SoS architecture for the SBA mission.
Optimality is ensured by the Taguchi method. The
difference between a cost-effective architecture and an
effective architecture is that the latter provides the best
performance, irrespective of the cost, while the former
takes both performance and cost into account in the
manner discussed in Section 3. We also develop an SoS
architecture heuristically, benefiting from the SEA
class’ operational experience and knowledge of systems
capability.
Our goals in this paper are:
• Explain our exploratory work in applying the
orthogonal array experiment (or the Taguchi
method) to solve system architecting problems,
which we treat as assignment problems.
• Delineate the mechanics of solving the system
architecting problems or assignment problems of
this kind and the procedures to process experi-
mental results.
• Illustrate our approach with the problem of ar-
chitecting an MTR SoS for the SBA mission.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we define the problem of architecting an MTR
SoS for the SBA mission and formulate it as an assign-
ment problem. In Section 3, as the scope of this paper
emphasizes the mechanics of applying the Taguchi
2The SBA scenario considered in this academic project and in this
paper does not reflect the official view of the Naval Postgraduate
School, the U.S. Navy, or the U.S. government.
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method to solve the MTR SoS architecting problem, we
will confine our discussion to the adaptation of the
Taguchi method for the problem at hand, without delv-
ing into all the statistical background and details of the
Taguchi method as it applies to the quality control
problem [Taguchi, 1978, 1993; Taguchi and Wu, 1980;
Roy, 1990; Bendell, Disney, and Pridmore, 1989]. We
then analyze the experimental results and obtain an
optimal cost-effective SoS architecture for the SBA
mission. In Section 4, to verify that the resulting cost-
effective SoS architecture is indeed a “best” architec-
ture, we compare its performance and cost to those of a
heuristically developed architecture and an optimal ef-
fective architecture. Finally, Section 5 contains some
concluding remarks.
2. MTR SoS ARCHITECTING PROBLEM AS
AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
We first define the problem of architecting a system of
systems to respond to small boat attacks and then for-
mulate it as an assignment problem.
2.1. MTR SoS Architecting Problem
The MTR mission to thwart a small boat attack includes
searching and detecting the threat (the attacker), neu-
tralizing the detected threat, and supporting and main-
taining the MTR SoS components. A functional
analysis identifies five top-level SoS functions: (1)
Command, Control, Computers, Communication, In-
telligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR),
(2) Prepare the Battlespace, (3) Find/Fix Threat, (4)
Finish Threat, and (5) Sustain. The C4ISR function
ensures that the SoS has the appropriate means to carry
out a mission in terms of command and control and to
have appropriate communication channels to keep the
forces informed of the status of operations. The Prepare
the Battlespace function ensures that the SoS has the
appropriate personnel, equipment, and platforms to
carry out the mission; it also renders the area of opera-
tions ready for countering a potential attack. The
Find/Fix and Finish functions are executed as MTR
forces actually carry out the mission; the word “Threat”
has been left out for convenience. The Sustain function
ensures that all units and equipment are properly sup-
ported and maintained for the duration of operations.
As the system concepts for Sustain are unique, system
concepts corresponding only to the first four top-level
functions are identified for use in an MTR SoS. Sustain
will thus not be included in the formulation of the MTR
SoS architecting problem as an assignment problem.
Finally, as will be seen soon, some functions may be
supported by as many as four different system concepts
to consider, while others by as few as two concepts.
We do not suggest that the system concepts consid-
ered here encompass all possible system solutions.
Rather, our research and analysis indicate that they
are potential “best fit” solutions associated with the
top-level SoS functions. We now briefly discuss the
system concepts.
C4ISR—The C4ISR has four elements: Command
and Control (C2), Communicate, Compute, and Pro-
vide Intelligence. The C4ISR system attributes are
“span of control,” command structure, the suite of
communications, and computing tools employed, and
intelligence products to be used by the SoS compo-
nents. “Span of control” relates to the size of the geo-
graphic region and the number of operating units in the
region under the control of a single commander. The
span of control can be Area or Local. An Area com-
mander controls the forces that search and protect ap-
proximately 20 commercial ships across the Pacific
Ocean as well as within San Francisco Bay. A Local
commander controls the forces that protect a single
high-value unit (HVU).
A command structure can be problem-solving or
objective-oriented. A problem-solving approach in-
volves issuing directives that articulate both missions
and objectives for two levels of subordinates and sub-
stantial guidance as to how the objectives are to be
achieved. An objective-oriented structure allows some
level of trust, creativity, and initiative in subordinate
commands, but it stresses synchronization of assets and
actions. In the maritime domain, the objective-oriented
structure is the most appropriate C2 command structure
option [Alberts and Hayes, 1995]. Incorporating the
advantages of the problem solving structure, it allows
increased coordination and continuous contact between
superior and subordinate commands as well as among
subordinate commands. The problem-solving approach
is also a C2 command structure option, which, as a
back-up command structure, would be used in the event
of either net-centric technology failure or lack of trust
in either technology or subordinates.
An MTR communications infrastructure must be
near real-time and interoperable across local law en-
forcement, national agencies, USN systems, and USCG
assets. The communications system must ensure that
messages, data, voice, or images exchanged among the
parties in the MTR SoS are transmitted and received
efficiently with minimal delays. Communications that
take place within a small group, task force, or agency
rely on local area networks (LAN); communications
that occur among all MTR actors use wireless networks
and paging systems.
The two main computing system components are
information assurance and data fusion. Information as-
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surance refers to the “technical and managerial meas-
ures designed to ensure the confidentiality, possession
or control, integrity, authenticity, availability and utility
of information and information systems” [An-
swers.com , 2006]. The MTR information assurance
system concentrates on protecting and securing the
systems and information within the MTR domain. Dur-
ing the entire period that information is being transmit-
ted, received, processed, and stored within the MTR
domain, the MTR system employs encryption and
authentication to protect information against unauthor-
ized access, hash the information to protect it from
modification without notice, and implement system
redundancy to protect the mission against the loss of
information. To prevent the loss of information or serv-
ices to the commanders, redundant systems are imple-
mented for disaster recovery. The defense-in-depth
security model is the guiding framework for the MTR
information assurance system concept.
Data fusion must enable a high level of situational
awareness while minimizing information overload.
Data/information certified as authentic from the trusted
external sources is then processed and correlated based
on the set of rules and requirements provided by the
commanders. A hybrid data fusion concept employs
both rule-based and self-learned algorithms such as
artificial intelligence or a neural network.
The intelligence component of C4ISR is not an
external system; it is a part of the SoS. The intelligence
component of C4ISR sends an entire fused common
operating picture (COP) to all operating units, the entire
fused COP blended with the common intelligence pic-
ture to all teams, and specific fused COPs blended with
a common intelligence picture (CIP) to the appropriate
teams.
In summary, the Communicate concept is a com-
bined Local Area Network, Wireless Metropolitan Area
Network, and Wide Area Paging. The Compute concept
is defense in depth and hybrid data fusion. The Provide
Intelligence concept is customized COP and CIP. The
C2 system concepts are Area Control/Problem Solving,
Area Control/Objective Oriented, Local Area/Problem
Solving, and Local Objective Oriented. While the Com-
municate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence compo-
nents are common to all C4ISR system concepts, the
C2 components vary among the C4ISR system con-
cepts. C2 thus distinguishes the C4ISR system con-
cepts. Consequently, we need not explicitly include the
Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence
components in the various C4ISR system concepts. The
C4ISR system options are then: (1) Area Control/Prob-
lem-solving, (2) Area Control/ Objective-oriented, (3)
Local Control/ Problem-solving, and (4) Local Con-
trol/Objective-oriented.
PBS—Again, the PBS function ensures that the SoS
has the appropriate personnel, equipment, and plat-
forms to carry out the mission; it also renders the area
of operations ready for countering a potential attack.
Four PBS system concepts are selected for the SBA
mission: (1) two small escorts, (2) two medium escorts,
(3) two small escorts and two medium escorts, and (4)
high-value unit based escort teams. A small escort is a
highly maneuverable, small boat (25–35 ft long) with
a top speed of 40 knots and a crew of four or five. A
medium escort is a larger craft (80–150 ft long) with
inboard engines, a top speed of 35 knots, and a crew of
20. For example, the U.S. Navy 34-ft Dauntless Boat
Units and the 110-ft Coast Guard cutter are, respec-
tively, a small and a medium escort. The medium escort
has a longer endurance. The small escort mounts one
medium machine gun in each position. The medium
escort has a medium caliber gun only in the bow posi-
tion and two medium machine guns on the port and
starboard positions. The team onboard the HVU con-
sists of six 2-man teams, each armed with a light ma-
chine gun.
Find/Fix—Involving only searching for surface con-
tacts during escort operations, Find/Fix for the SBA
mission employs visual means (e.g., binoculars), radar,
or both radar and visual means. Almost every modern
vessel of appreciable size routinely employs both
means. The distinction between the two search methods
is important in the case of small craft. Small vessels
with limited height of eye have a short visual detection
radius. Visual search is also dependent on weather
conditions. The detection capability is then based on the
presence of visual detection mechanisms, radar detec-
tion mechanisms, or a combination of both. The
Find/Fix options are thus: (1) visual detection and (2)
visual detection with surface search radar support.
Finish—Finish for the SBA mission is considered in
conjunction with the PBS function, which is focused on
weapons, platforms, and combinations of platforms
(escort options). The focus now shifts to the additional
advantages the response team gains by employing
armed helicopters and unarmed unmanned surface ve-
hicles (USV). Parenthetically, PBS involves escort op-
erations while Finish hostile engagement; armed
helicopters are thus needed to execute it. An armed
helicopter offers additional capability to challenge sus-
picious small boat traffic, “clear a path” for the HVU,
and engage the threat. A USV physically places itself
between a suspicious boat and an HVU without involv-
ing personnel. The USV can deliver challenges and
warnings at large distances from the HVU and therefore
offers the response team considerable time available for
a lethal engagement. The USV could be outfitted with
various cameras and other sensors to classify surface
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contacts and loudspeakers, police lights, pyrotechnics,
or other low-cost measures to warn innocent boaters.
The USV could also shoulder suspect vessels or ram
identified targets and complicate enemy plans by forc-
ing the threat to take action earlier than planned. Re-
search and existing programs suggest that a USV with
the described capabilities could be fielded within the
required five-year timeframe. Four SBA Finish system
concepts are: (1) organic weapons, (2) organic weapons
and armed helicopters, (3) organic weapons and USVs,
and (4) organic weapons, USVs, and armed helicopters.
Table I summarizes the four top-level SoS functions
and their associated system concepts. An MTR SoS
architecture is a combination of these system concepts.
But which pertinent system concept is selected to per-
form a top-level function, so that, together, the selected
system concepts constitute an optimal MTR SoS archi-
tecture, in the sense that it maximizes some objective
function of performance and cost? Performance refers
to the probability of mission success. Cost includes the
cost of delay to commerce caused by the response to the
threats and the cost associated with the SoS. We now
formulate the MTR SoS architecting problem as an
assignment problem.
2.2. MTR SoS Architecting as an
Assignment Problem
Let F denote the set of the SoS top-level functions, Fj,
j = 1, …, 4, and Sj the set of system concepts that can
perform function Fj. Let X denote a set of allocation







1,    if system concept k of Sj 
          is assigned to function Fj,
0,    otherwise,
where j = 1, …, 4, and k = 1, …, |Sj|; |Sj| denotes the
number of elements (i.e., system concepts) in Sj. As
shown in Table I, 
|S3| = 2  and  |S1| = |S2| = |S4| = 4.
2.2.1. Probability of Mission Success
An SBA mission is declared a success if the terrorist
attack boat is prevented from reaching a lethal range (50
yards) of a protected asset. If the terrorist attack boat is
still alive when reaching within the lethal range of the
protected asset, then the SBA mission is a failure. The
SBA mission success or failure is related to the alloca-
tions of the system concepts to the top-level functions;
that is, it is a function of Xjk. The probability of mission
success, Ps, thus depends on the allocations Xjk. It is
obtained by Monte Carlo simulation, as the Monte
Carlo method is a convenient and useful method for
obtaining solutions to the problem at hand. The prob-
ability of mission success, Ps, is the fraction of the
number of Monte Carlo simulation runs in which the
SBA mission is a success.
2.2.2. Cost
All costs are in Fiscal Year 2006 millions of US dollars
(FY2006$M). The total cost of an SoS architecture
depends on the allocations Xjk. It is contributed by the
cost of procurement of both additional existing and new
SoS components (platforms), the cost of operating and
supporting (O&S) the SoS, and the cost associated with
both time delay suffered by commerce (the ferries and
the oil tankers) in the course of responding to an attack,
and the cost associated with damage to the physical
entities resulting from failures to neutralize the terrorist
threat. Table II contains the cost estimates of the system
             Table I. System Concepts for the Top-Level Functions
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concepts. The delay and damage costs are generated by
the mission-level modeling and simulation. The estima-
tion of the remaining costs follows.
MTR O&S Costs—The annual MTR O&S costs are
the product of the number of days per year the SoS
would be involved in MTR-related activities and the
daily O&S rate, which is the sum of the daily O&S rates
for the SoS platforms and those for the personnel in-
volved. The daily O&S rates for the selected platforms
used in the MTR SoS is calculated by dividing the
average annual O&S costs by 365 days. Two types of
platforms constitute the SoS: Platforms for which cost
data are available and platforms for which there are no
cost data. The average annual O&S costs of existing
platforms are obtained by adjusting data from Visibility
and Management of Operating and Support Costs
(VAMOSC) [Navy VAMOSC, 2006]. For the platforms
for which VAMOSC data do not exist, existing analo-
gous VAMOSC data are adopted and adjusted as
needed. The daily O&S rates for the platforms are then
obtained by dividing the average O&S costs by 365
days. The daily O&S rate for MTR personnel is com-
puted, based on the most recent annual pay and allow-
ances of all Navy and Marine Corps officers and
enlisted men, the total number of full-time equivalents
in both services, and a basis of 365 days per year. The
number of days per year the MTR SoS is employed is
now determined, based on the following assumptions:
(1) a standard two-week annual training for board-
ing/search teams; (2) all platforms participating in one
10-day exercise per year and one actual operation per
year; and (3) the SBA mission lasting for 30 days.
MTR Procurement Costs—The procurement of
both additional existing platforms and new platforms
accounts for MTR SoS procurement costs. Official
Department of Defense budget documents [OUSD,
2006], if available, or Jane’s and the original equipment
manufacturer Web site are used to the maximum extent
possible to obtain unit costs for the existing platforms.
The costs of new systems are obtained by adjusting
appropriately the costs of analogous existing systems.
As an exception, program-of-record national fleet as-
sets, such as the Littoral Combat Ship and the National
Security Cutter, are assumed to be sunk costs and
therefore are not included in the total cost. The procure-
ment costs of the systems supporting the top-level SoS
functions are now elaborated.
C4ISR—The main components of the C4ISR sys-
tem are the Boarding Team Communications Pack
(BTCP), correlation engine software, software training,
headquarters workstations, shipboard combat informa-
tion centers, small boat communications equipment,
space-based and land-based stations, and the planning
effort required to develop rules of engagement and
standard operating procedures for MTR missions. All
of the components are assumed to exist in an adequate
form with the exception of the BTCP, correlation en-
gine, and dedicated personnel for software and commu-
nications gear currency and readiness requirements.
The detailed cost estimate for a single BTCP, based on
data from manufacturers’ Web sites and analogous
equipment, is $15,005. The Rosetta Stone Advanced
Capability Technology Demonstration is used as the
analogy for correlation engine algorithm development
and technology demonstration. It is assumed that Area
C2 requires only one correlation engine, while Local
Table II. Cost Estimates*
*The Find/Fix system concepts incur no cost as their costs
are already assessed under PBS and the radar is organic to
both the small and medium escorts.
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C2 requires an engine for each HVU escort team. An
additional $2.5 million per C2 location is assumed for
hardware/software integration costs, and the software
O&S cost is 20% of the RDT&E cost. Each software-
installed location is assumed to require one commander,
two analyst/operators, one boarding team communica-
tions expert, and one boarding team gear main-
tainer/storekeeper, all full time. No cost differential is
identified between the problem-solving and the objec-
tive-oriented command structures. The total C4ISR cost
estimates are $12.1 M and $60.2 M for Area C2 (Option
1 and 2) and Local C2 (3 and 4), respectively.
PBS—The PBS main components are escort boats
and boarding teams. The small escort boats are Rigid
Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) and other light pa-
trol/security craft. The small boat unit cost is taken to
be the average of the costs of the USCG Long Range
Interceptor, the SeaArk Marine “Dauntless” craft, and
Special Operations Forces combatant craft systems.
The mall escort O&S cost is assumed to be 20% of the
PC O&S cost. The mid-sized escorts used in Options 2
and 3 are similar to the Navy Patrol Coastal (PC) or the
USCG Fast Response Cutter (FRC). The PC O&S cost
and FRC procurement costs are therefore used. The
total costs of the four different PBS options are roughly
$92.6 M, $1,534.8 M, $583.9 M, and $36.1 M for
Options 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Find/Fix—The main components of Find/Fix are the
search teams and surface search radar. Because the costs
associated with the teams are included under PBS and
the radar is organic to both the small and medium
escorts, there is no additional cost for either of these two
options.
Finish—Finish employs the escort teams and plat-
forms whose costs are already accounted for under
PBS. The number of teams is consistent with PBS: 10
teams for Options 1, 2, and 3, and 27 teams for Option
4. Additionally, the Finish main components include
hand-held weapons, armed helicopters, and unmanned
surface vehicles (USVs). The MK-19 Grenade Launch-
er procurement cost is used as the standard hand-held
weapon cost. The hand-held weapon O&S cost is as-
sumed to be 25% of procurement cost. The helicopter
O&S daily rate is based on that of the Navy H-60. The
SeaFox USV is used as a basis for assessing the USV
procurement cost. Because the SeaFox is built atop an
8-m RHIB, the SeaFox O&S cost is 20% of the PC O&S
cost. The cost estimates are roughly $0.8 M, $13.8 M,
$21.3 M, and $35.7 M for Options 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively.
Sustain—Nearly all critical sustaining costs are
based on the VAMOSC data. For example, food is
included through the Basic Allowance for Subsistence
cost in the VAMOSC personnel data. The VAMOSC
database also accounts for the majority of SoS mainte-
nance requirements. Any spares needed to meet reliabil-
ity requirements are included in unit quantities. For
example, although only 4 USVs are required for an
HVU, a total of 92 must be procured to account for
refueling, maintenance, and breakage. Training cost is
based on the duration of MTR activities, which include
a 10-day exercise per year per mission and a 2-week
school for boarding team members on MTR mission-
specific equipment and procedures.
2.2.3. Objective Function
In this work, we introduce a dimensionless objective
function, z, which results from mapping the perform-
ance measure (Ps) and the total system cost (C) by
means of a rule ρ according to
z = ρ(Ps, C).
The objective function z is thus a function of the
allocations Xjk. A specific rule ρ which will result in a
dimensionless objective function will be elaborated in
the Taguchi data analysis (Section 3.4).
The problem of optimizing the MTR SoS architec-
ture amounts to determining an assignment of the sys-
tem concepts to the four SoS top-level functions (i.e.,
the allocations Xjk) that maximizes the objective func-
tion z. We solve this problem using the orthogonal array
experiment approach employed in Huynh [1997] and
Huynh and Gillen [2001].
3. THE ORTHOGONAL ARRAY
EXPERIMENT
Having a mathematical foundation in linear algebra—
specifically, the Galois field theory—orthogonal arrays
began with Euler as Latin squares in the 18th century
[Euler, 1849]. R.A. Fisher was the first to apply them
extensively. Factorial design of experiments was first
introduced by R. A. Fisher in the 1920s. For a full
factorial design the number of possible conditions or
experiments is Lm, where m is the number of factors and
L is the number of levels for each factor. Taguchi’s
partial factorial design requires only a smaller number
of unique factor/level combinations captured in an or-
thogonal array. All combinations of levels occur and
occur an equal number of times in every pair of columns
of an orthogonal array. This combinatorial property
ensures the orthogonality property [Pao, Phadke, and
Sherrerd, 1989]; all columns in the array are thus or-
thogonal to each other.
The work discussed in this paper is focused only on
the SBA mission, which is one of the MTR missions
addressed in Kessler et al. [2006], in which two to four
different system concepts (levels) could be assigned to
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seven system-level functions (factors) to account for all
MTR missions. For a full factorial design the number
of possible combinations of these system concepts,
3072, need be evaluated for their effectiveness, using
Monte Carlo simulation. Each simulation run, taking
place on an Intel Pentium (R) CPU 3.40 GHz Dell
computer, takes more than 3 min. It would therefore
take 704 days of continuous running of the simulation
to evaluate those potential combinations (architec-
tures), with each combination requiring 100 simulation
runs. This would be impractical.
An efficient form of fractional experiment design is
thus needed, which would dramatically reduce the over-
all number of combinations or architectural trials and
simulation time. An efficient form of experiment design
is known as the Taguchi method, commonly associated
with measures to achieve higher levels of quality con-
trol in a manufacturing process [Roy, 1990]. The
Taguchi method involves using orthogonal arrays, ob-
taining the so-called response from each combination
or architectural trial, analyzing the effects of the differ-
ent system concepts, and determining an optimal archi-
tecture from the analysis. In the Taguchi parlance, the
system functions are called factors, and the various
system concepts corresponding to the system functions
are called levels. This method amounts to optimally
assigning the levels (system concepts) to each factor
(system functions) in order to achieve the best possible
result for some response function. The application of
the Taguchi method to the assignment problem at hand
is, again, motivated by a successful extension of the
Taguchi method to solve assignment problems [Huynh,
1997; Huynh and Gillen, 2001]. It must be pointed out
that the Taguchi method has nothing to do with com-
puter power. It has to do with saving costs in carrying
out experiments to find ways to achieve desired product
quality [Roy, 1990]. It is in the exploratory work
[Huynh, 1997; Huynh and Gillen, 2001] that experi-
mentation is carried out by computer simulation. Even
with the existing computer power, in some circum-
stances the Taguchi method is still preferred over the
full factorial design or other mathematical optimization
[Huynh and Kohfeld, 1994; Huynh, 1997].
3.1. Definition of Factors and Levels
A key step in designing orthogonal array experiments
is defining the factors and their levels [Pao, Phadke, and
Sherrerd, 1989]. In the Taguchi parlance [Roy, 1990],
factors are the causes which produce an effect, levels
are the way in which the factors are changed, and the
response is the result produced by the factors. In our
approach, we identify the SoS top-level functions as
factors; thus, C4ISR, PBS, Find/Fix, and Finish are the
factors. From here on, functions and factors are used
interchangeably. Care should be exercised to choose
factors and levels appropriately so as to take advantage
of the established orthogonal arrays. There is no sys-
tematic way to define factors and their levels for assign-
ment problems in general [Huynh, 1997]. For the
problem at hand, the levels of a function (factor) are
defined as the different system concepts that can per-
form the function. The system concepts supporting a
function are thus the levels of the function (factor).
3.2. The Orthogonal Array Experiment
Design
At the outset, for the problem at hand, an experiment is
a computer simulation. As mentioned above, the full
factorial experiment to explore all possible factor-level
combinations would impractically require performing
a large number of experiments in this case. The use of
orthogonal arrays reduces the number of experiments
drastically.
Taguchi and Wu [1980] have tabulated a number of
orthogonal arrays which can be conveniently used to
construct orthogonal designs for any experimental situ-
ation. The appropriate orthogonal array for the problem
at hand is a portion of the mixed orthogonal array
L32(21,49), shown in Table III [Taguchi and Konishi,
1987]. Note that the full orthogonal array L32(21,49) can
be used to study up to 9 factors at 4 levels per factor and
1 factor with 2 levels. The columns in the array corre-
spond to the factors (functions). Each of the 32 rows or
experiments (or conditions) corresponds to an architec-
ture trial. The entries in the orthogonal array, ranging
from 1 to 4, represent the system concepts (levels)
shown in Table I. Each level in the orthogonal array is
used in each factor and each appears an equal number
of times. The different combinations are varied
throughout the array so that each level has at least one
trial with every level from every other factor.
3.3. Experiment
3.3.1. Experimental Procedure
Carrying out an experiment for each row of the orthogo-
nal array means performing a Monte Carlo simulation
of the MTR SoS response, z, to an attack of a HVU by
a small boat attacker. The Monte Carlo simulation
involves 2000 simulation runs of an EXTEND  SBA
mission model,3 each of which produces success or
failure of the SBA mission. Again, by success we mean
the MTR forces successfully prevent the small boat
attacker from hitting the HVU. By failure we mean that
3EXTEND  is a modeling and simulation tool developed by Imag-
ine That!, Inc., San Jose, CA.
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the small boat attacker has closed within 50 yards of the
HVU. A statistical analysis of the Monte Carlo simula-
tion results then yields the probability of mission suc-
cess.
3.3.2. SBA Mission Model
Since this paper is focused on application of the Taguchi
method, we will not elucidate in detail the EXTEND
SBA mission model; instead, we will provide a cursory
description of the EXTEND  SBA mission, its input,
and its output. The EXTEND  SBA mission model
represents the C4ISR, PBS, Find/Fix, and Finish func-
tions, the kinematics of the small boat attacker, the
response engagement geometry, the engagement types
(i.e., warning and lethal engaging), the engagement
sequence (e.g., helicopter followed by close escorts or
the onboard team), and the MTR SoS responses. Con-
strained by the scope of the paper, we will not describe
the modules (with their EXTEND  icons) of the EX-
TEND  SBA mission model; instead, for illustration
purposes only, we include a representative snippet of
the EXTEND  SBA mission model, shown in Figure
1. We also hasten to add that the accuracy and fidelity
of the models used in the simulation affect the response
of each experiment, and, hence, the Taguchi analysis
results. Care must thus be taken to ensure the models in
the simulation are accurate and have a similar level of
fidelity.
C4ISR is simulated through initial orders, which are
issued upon receipt of intelligence that a small boat
attack might occur. Some time delay, assumed to be
constant, is incurred with the action of issuing the initial
orders. As related to the assessment of mission success,
if the small boat attack takes place before or during the
course of issuing the initial orders, then the MTR SoS
system will fail to stop the attack.
Find/Fix is represented through the identification
and classification function. The time it takes the MTR
forces to identify and classify the small boat attacker
varies according to the means employed in the Find/Fix:
10 s for visual means and 5 s for both visual means and
radar.
The small boat attacker’s position relative to the high
value target (i.e., the initial attacking distance) is initial-
ized by adding an initial attacking distance variation to
a nominal distance. The former is a function of the
system concepts associated with the PBS and of Finish
functions. The latter is assumed to admit a normal
distribution with a mean of 500 yards and a standard
deviation of 150 yards. 
Engagement involves warning and engaging. Warn-
ing is carried out by non-lethal or lethal means. In this
work, the terms “nonlethal” and “lethal” refer to the
means by which the warning is issued, not its intended
effect. For instance, the nonlethal warnings could in-
clude auditory warnings, police-type lighting, or pyro-
technics. The lethal warnings denote firing shots in
front of a potential small boat attacker. During the
course of engagement, engagement decisions will be
made as to when nonlethal or lethal warning and non-
lethal or lethal engaging are executed and by whom (the
armed helicopters, the escorts, or the team onboard).
The engagement decisions depend on the closing dis-
tance (i.e., the remaining distance) between the small
boat attacker and the HVU. The small boat attacker’s
speed is assumed to be constant during its attack. As a
result, this distance is linearly reduced with the elapsed
time (relative to the time of the initial attacking dis-
tance).
If the closing distance is sufficient (i.e., it is greater
than 50 yards), then the helicopter will give a nonlethal
warning, which takes 10 s. In the absence of armed
helicopters, the MTR escorts or the team onboard the
HVU will give a nonlethal warning, which takes also
10 s or, if Finish uses USVs, 5 s. If the closing distance
Table III. The Orthogonal Array Reduced from
L32(21,49)
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is insufficient or the nonlethal warning is unheeded, the
armed helicopter will fire lethal warning shots, which
will take 5 s. If an armed helicopter is not present, the
MTR close escorts will fire lethal warning shots, which
will also take 5 s or, if the Finish alternative includes
USVs, 2.5 s. If the closing distance is insufficient, the
helicopter will lethally engage the small boat attacker.
Otherwise, the MTR close escorts will engage the at-
tacker. The effectiveness (i.e., probability of kill) of the
helicopter is related to the closing distance.
If the nonlethal warning is unsuccessful and if the
closing distance is sufficient for carrying out a nonlethal
engagement on the small boat attacker, then the MTR
escorts or the team onboard the HVU will spend 10 s to
nonlethally engage the small boat attacker. If the clos-
ing distance is sufficient for lethal warning or if lethal
warning fails, then the MTR escorts or the team on-
board the HVU will lethally engage the small boat
attacker once it is within 500 yards of the HVU. The
probability of kill by MTR escorts or the team onboard
the HVU also depends on the closing distance. If the
small boat attacker is within 50 yards of the HVU, then
the MTR forces do not have enough time to lethally
engage the attacker and the SoS will therefore be inef-
fective.
As aforementioned, ferries and oil tankers traveling
within the area of operations constitute commerce. The
delay imposed to commerce by the MTR forces during
the SBA mission is a function of the number of ferries
and oil tankers to be escorted, the number of escort
teams available, and the duration of the operation
(measured in days). We assume daily HVU traffic con-
sists of eight ferries operating 12 h and five oil tankers
transiting for 10 h. The oil tankers arrive in a uniformly
distributed fashion over the entire 24-h period. We also
assume the cost of delaying an oil tanker to be greater
than the cost of delaying a ferry, and priority is given to
escorting oil tankers whenever a scheduling conflict
arises. The architectures considered for the SBA mis-
sion are specifically designed to cause no delay to
commerce.
Input to the SBA mission model includes the portion
of the L32(21,49) orthogonal array (Table III), the SoS
architecture alternatives with their components and per-
tinent characteristics, the initial distance of the attacker
from the HVU and its variance, and all constant quan-
tities (e.g., time to issue warnings, time of classification,
and so forth).
Output from the SBA mission model is mission
success or failure for each Monte Carlo run. Post-proc-
essing yields the probability of mission success for each
of the 32 trials (experiments). Table IV displays the
experimental results—the probability of mission suc-
cess (in the second column) and the total cost (in the
third column) for each of the 32 trials (in the first
column)—and the dimensionless response (in the
fourth column) defined in Section 3.4.
3.4. Data Analysis
As in Huynh [1997] and Huynh and Gillen [2001], the
data analysis performed here consists of the standard
analysis outlined by Taguchi. The purpose of the data
analysis is to study the main effects of each of the
factors (the SoS top-level functions) in order to identify
the optimal condition [Roy, 1990]. The main effects
indicate the general trend of the influence of the factors;
that is, the effect of a factor (function) on the objective
function when it goes from one level (system concept)
to another. The analysis of the main effects involves the
calculation of the averages for the levels of all factors.
We describe the data analysis next.
Associated with the ith experiment (row) are the
probability of mission success, Psi, and the cost, Ci. The
architectural trial (row in the orthogonal array) that
yields the most expensive architecture is assigned a
Table IV. Experimental Results
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score of 0 for cost, while the trial that yields the least
expensive architecture a score of 100 for cost. These
two extreme data are then used in a linear function to
obtain the dimensionless cost scores of the remaining
trials, which vary between 0 and 100. The resulting
dimensionless cost ξi associated with the ith experiment
(row) is then given by
ξi = 100ξmax − ξmin
 (ξmax − Ci),
where ξmax = maxi∈NεCi, ξmin = mini∈NεCi, and Nε and
denotes the number of experiments (rows).
Likewise, the trial that yields the highest probability
of success is assigned a score of 100 for effectiveness,
while the trial that yields the lowest probability of
success a score of 0 for effectiveness. These two ex-
treme data are then used in a linear function to obtain
the dimensionless effectiveness scores of the remaining
trials, which vary between 0 and 100. The resulting
dimensionless cost  associated with the ith experiment




 (PSi − πmin),
where πmax = maxi∈NεPSi and πmin = mini∈NεPSi.
In this work, the rule ρ (Section 2.2) that amalga-
mates the total cost Ci, and the probability of success,
PSi, into the dimensionless response zi associated with
the ith row is simply the linear combination of the two
resulting dimensionless scores,
zi = λPSπi + λCξi,
in which λPS and λC are the weighting coefficients
associated with πi  and  ξi. The weighting coefficients
λPS and λC, which take values in [0, 1], are such that
λPS + λC = 1. Note that an optimal effective architecture
corresponds to λC = 0. When both the performance and
the cost are equally weighted, as done in this work, the
weighting coefficients λPC and λCξi are taken to be 0.5
in order for zi to take values in [0, 100]. This formulation
thus allows flexibility in adjusting the contributions of
the cost and performance to the response. The response








 (PSi − πmin) + 
100
ξmax − ξmin
 (ξmax − Ci)
 ,
which is the average of the two resulting dimensionless
scores πi and ξi.
Let aij denote the level of the jth column (function
or factor) in the ith row (trial, experiment, or condition),
zi the response (i.e., the objective function) correspond-
ing to the ith row. Then the average performance (i.e.,
the objective function) of the jth factor (function) at the
αjth  level, denoted by 〈 fjαj〉 is calculated according to







δ(aij − αj)zi,   

j = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,4
αj = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , |Sj|
 , 
in which Njαj, the number of experiments (rows) the
αjth level (system function) assigned to the jth factor
(function) is




δ(aij − αj) 
and
δ(aij − αj) = 

1,    if aij = αj,
0,    otherwise.
 
For the problem at hand,
Njαj = 

8,      j = 1, 2, 4,
16,    j = 3.  
In this work it is convenient to deal with the so-called
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which is defined as
SNRjαj = 2ln〈 fjαj〉, rather than with 〈 fjαj〉. Taguchi effec-
tively employs the concept of SNR, which originates in
the electrical engineering field, in quality control. The
“signal” is the change in the quality characteristics of a
product under investigation in response to a factor
introduced in the experimental design. The “noise”
refers to external factors (or noise factors) that affect the
quality characteristic under test. The signal-to-noise
ratio quantifies the sensitivity of the quality charac-
teristic to the noise [Roy, 1990]. Since the quality
characteristic (in the Taguchi parlance) of the problem
at hand is “the larger the better” performance (the
objective function), the levels of the factors are identi-
fied according to the maximum signal-to-noise ratio. If
SNRjk = maxαjSNRjαj, then the αkth level (system con-
cept) is assigned to the jth factor (top-level function).
Reflecting the data analysis results in Table V, Figure 2
displays the graphs of the signal-to-noise ratios against
the levels (system concepts) for each factor (function).
It depicts the main effects of the factors (functions) on
the objective function. The selected level of a factor
corresponds to the largest signal-to-noise ratio.
                                           SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS RESPONDING TO SMALL BOAT ATTACKS  253
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
3.5. Optimal, Cost-Effective MTR SoS
Architecture
Both Figure 2 and Table V show that SNR12 is the
largest value among the values SNR1α1, SNR21 maxi-
mum among the values SNR2α2, SNR32 the largest
among the values SNR3α3, and SNR44 maximum among
the values SNR4α4. In other words, the maximum sig-
nal-to-noise ratios are obtained with factor 1 at level 2,
factor 2 at level 1, factor 3 at level 2, and factor 4 at level
4. This means that, as displayed in Table VI, the optimal
cost-effective MTR SoS architecture consists of Area
control/Objective-oriented for C4ISR, Small escorts for
PBS, Visual detection with surface search radar support
for Find/Fix, and Organic weapons, USVs, and armed
helicopters for Finish. As shown in Tables II and V and
Figure 3, this optimal cost-effective MTR SoS architec-
ture results in a 0.72 probability of mission success and
costs $188.6 M. Figure 4 shows the high-level opera-
tional concept of the optimal, cost-effective MTR SoS
architecture. The operational environment is San Fran-
cisco Bay. The dashed line indicates a route (threat path)
potentially taken by the attacker. The potential targets
are the commercial traffic. The placement of the SoS
components, which does not necessarily reflect realism,
is intended to show their SoS membership, with the
names of the SoS components placed as close as possi-
ble to the components. The “lightning strokes” depict
the communications among the SoS elements.
Table VI. Allocation of System Concepts to Top-level
Functions in the Optimal Cost-effective SBA SoS
Architecture
Figure 2. Effects of the SoS functions on the objective
function.
Table V. Data Analysis Results for the Optimal
Cost-effective Architecture
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4. COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
To verify that the resulting cost-effective SoS architec-
ture is indeed a “best” architecture, we compare its
performance and cost with those of two additional
architectures, namely, a optimal effective SoS architec-
ture and a heuristic cost-effective SoS architecture. The
Taguchi method is also employed to develop the opti-
mal effective architecture, but with the objective func-
tion being the probability of mission success; the cost
is not considered. The heuristic cost-effective SoS ar-
chitecture is based on the collective experience of the
SEA class [Kessler et al., 2006] and consists of the
lowest cost system concepts that would meet system
effectiveness requirements. Table VII shows the com-
ponents of these two architectures along with those of
the optimal cost-effective SoS architecture.
Figure 3. Cost-effectiveness of the heuristic cost-effective,
optimal cost-effective, and optimal effective SBA SoS archi-
tectures.
Figure 4. The high-level operational concept of the MTR SoS countering small boat attacks in the San Francisco Bay.
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Figure 3 shows the cost-effectiveness curve, which
depicts the cost of each architecture against the prob-
ability of success for the SBA mission. The “knee” in
the cost-effectiveness curve corresponds to the optimal
cost-effective architecture. The large difference be-
tween the cost of the optimal effective architecture and
those of the two cost-effective architectures is caused
by the cost of procurement of the requisite number of
medium escorts. As shown in Table II, the cost for
procurement of the combined small and medium escort
force in the optimal effective architecture for the SBA
mission is roughly $1584 M; the cost for procurement
of the only small escort force in the two cost-effective
architectures is approximately $93 M. A roughly
1603% increase in the SBA mission cost results in only
an approximately 16% improvement in the probability
of mission success over the optimal cost-effective ar-
chitecture. Furthermore, the USVs in the optimal cost-
effective architecture provide roughly a similar
improvement in the probability of mission success over
the heuristic cost-effective architecture, but at a cost of
only about $38 million, which equates to a 34% in-
crease in cost. Also, while its performance is not sig-
nificantly higher than that of the heuristic cost-effective
architecture, the optimal cost-effective architecture pro-
vides an order of magnitude greater improvement per
unit cost than that provided by the optimal effective
architecture. The Taguchi approach does thus lead to a
“best” MTR SoS architecture for the SBA mission.
5. CONCLUSION
As in Huynh [1997] and Huynh and Gillen [2001], our
exploratory work here establishes the applicability of
the orthogonal array experiment (or the Taguchi
method) to optimizing an SoS architecture.
The crux of the MTR SoS architecting problem in
this work is to develop architectures of a conceptual,
cost-effective, near-term system of systems (SoS) to
respond to terrorist threats to the United States that
emanate from the maritime domain—in particular, to
small boats used by terrorists to attack maritime com-
merce traffic and critical shore infrastructures. To solve
this SoS architecting problem, we formulate it as an
assignment problem which is then solved using the
orthogonal array experiment. The orthogonal array ex-
periment approach allows us to solve this assignment
problem by carrying out the smallest possible number
of experiments and determining the solution from the
responses of the experiments. It is efficient and, for this
class of problems, provides an optimal cost-effective
architecture for the MTR SoS. The results discussed in
this paper underline this successful exploratory work in
architecting an SoS.
This work provides some insights into the SoS solu-
tion to the problem of maritime threat response to SBA
in the 5-year timeframe. Further research is needed to
provide additional insights into the following areas.
While armed helicopters appear to be useful in coun-
tering a small boat attack, it is not clear, however,
whether their usefulness results from their ability to
scout sea space ahead of the protected vessel and warn
incoming boats, their ability to be a rapid reaction
engagement platform, or both. The area in which armed
helicopters add value to the overall SBA architecture
Table VII. Allocation of System Concepts to
Top-Level Functions in the Heuristic Cost-Effective,
Optimal Cost-effective, and Optimal Effective SBA
SoS Architectures
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thus need be isolated; this in turn could ascertain in-
creased effectiveness of such helicopters.
Nonlethal weapons are useful in warding off inno-
cent boats that venture too close to protected vessels in
the counter SBA mission. However, an attacking boat
would presumably continue to press its attack even in
the face of such nonlethal weapons engagement by
MTR forces. An analysis is needed to assess the effec-
tiveness of the use of nonlethal weapons in securing
prisoners possessing potential intelligence value while
reducing the likelihood of civilian casualties in the case
that a failed nonlethal weapons engagement necessarily
precipitates lethal weapons employment.
This work considers a formation in which a pro-
tected vessel has an escort vessel in front, behind, and
to each side of it. Future work needs to examine other
formations and their potential benefits such as a possi-
ble reduction in the required number of escort forces.
The potential difficulties associated with multiple at-
tackers, decoy attack boats, and other concerted terror-
ist efforts also need be analyzed. An SBA countering
concept need be developed to deal with a situation in
which the terrorist attack boat en route to the protected
vessel would engage the escort vessels rather than sim-
ply attempt to bypass the escort vessels
The prohibition on recreational boat traffic upon
receipt of intelligence suggesting a small boat attack
can be implemented effectively. However, what is the
most efficient method to clear the bay of nonessential
boat traffic? A study could be devoted to finding such a
method.
Furthermore, a detailed analysis is needed to assess
the technologies, control system capabilities, and costs
of the USVs.
Finally, the SoS architecting methodology espoused
in this paper can be extended to architecting other
systems of systems. Such extension will require appro-
priate orthogonal arrays to reflect the required SoS
top-level functions and the system concepts selected for
these functions. In this work we deal with a small
number of system-level functions (factors) and a small
number of related system concepts (levels) and hence a
small and readily available orthogonal array. For any
SoS that has a large number of system-level functions
and a large number of associated levels, a large orthogo-
nal array is needed. Large orthogonal arrays can be
generated or obtained from the American Supplier In-
stitute [ASI].
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ACRONYMS
C2 Command and Control
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Re-
connaissance
CIP Common Intelligence Picture
COP Common Operating Picture
FRC Fast Response Cutter
HVU High Value Unit
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MMA Major Metropolitan Area
MTR Maritime Threat Response
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
O&S Operating and Support
PBS Prepare the Battlespace
PC Patrol Coastal
POR Program of Record
Ps Probability of Success
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evalu-
ation
RHIB Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
SBA Small Boat Attack
SEA Systems Engineering and Analysis
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SoS System of Systems
U.S. United States
USCG United States Coast Guard
USN United States Navy
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operat-
ing and Support Costs
PACAREA Pacific Area
REFERENCES
D.S. Alberts and R.E. Hayes, Command arrangements for
peace operations, Command and Control Research Pro-
gram (CCRP) Publications, National Defense University,
1995.
Answers.com , Information assurance, http://www.an-
swers.com/information%20assurance, April 2006.
B. Arnold, C. Cammarata, D. Farmer, K. Kowalewski, F.
Ladipo, M. Lasky, and D. Moore, The economic costs of
disruptions in container shipments, Congressional Budget
Office, Washington, DC, March 29, 2006.
ASI, American Supplier Institute, 38701 Seven Mile Rd.,
Suite #355, Livonia, MI 48152.
A. Bendell, J. Disney, and W. A. Pridmore (Editors), Taguchi
methods, applications in world industry, IFS Publica-
tions/Springer, New York, 1989.
                                           SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS RESPONDING TO SMALL BOAT ATTACKS  257
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
W.W. Chu, Optimal file allocation in a multiple computer
system, IEEE Trans Comput 18(10) (October 1969), 885–
889.
L. Euler, Recherches sur une espece de carres magiques,
Commentationes Arithmeticae Collectae, Vol. II, St. Pe-
terburg Acad. Sci., St. Peterburg, 1849, pp. 302–361.
J.F. Frittelli, Port and maritime security: Background and
issues for Congress, CRS, Washington, D.C, Report for
Congress, Order Code RL31733, May 27, 2005.
J. Howland, Countering maritime terrorism, U.S. thwarts
attack, builds up foreign navies, The Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs (JINSA), www.jinsa.org, June
17 2004, last accessed in 2005.
T.V. Huynh, Optimal file allocation in a distributed computer
network by orthogonal array experiments, IEEE Aero-
space Appl Conf Proc 4 (1997), 105–114.
T.V. Huynh and D.C. Gillen, Dynamic bandwidth allocation
in a satellite communication network, IEEE Aerospace
Appl Conf Proc 3 (2001), 1221–1232.
T. V. Huynh and J.J. Kohfeld, Optimal functional allocation
in a tactical BM/C3I system, 1994 Symp Command Con-
trol Res Decision Aids, Monterey, CA, June 21–23, 1994,
pp. 386–391.
A. Kessler, M. Schewfelt, B. Connett, C. Chiurourman, J.
Oravec, S. Wark, J. Davis, Ling Siew Ng, Seng Chuan
Lim, Cheng Lock Chua, Eng Choon Yeo, Kok Long Lee,
Heng Hui Chew, Kwang Yong Lim, Ee Shen Tean, Sze Tek
Ho, and Koh Choon Chung, Maritime threat response,
Report prepared by the Naval Postgraduate School for the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, Number NPS-97-06-004, 2600 Defense Penta-
gon, Washington, DC, June 2006.
Navy VMOSC, Naval Center for Cost Analysis, Visibility and
management of operating and support costs database,
http://www.navyvamosc.com, March 2006.
OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller), Department of Defense Summary Budget Mate-
rials/Budget Links, http://www.dod..mil/ comp-
troller/budgetindex.html, March 2006.
R. Perl and R. O’Rourke, Terrorist attack on USS Cole:
Background and issues for Congress, CRS, Washington,
D.C.,  Report for Congress, Order Code RS20721, March
2001.
T.W. Pao, M.S. Phadke, and C.S. Sherrerd, Computer re-
sponse time optimization using orthogonal array experi-
ments in Taguchi methods, Applications in World
Industry, IFS Publications/Springer, New York, 1989.
R. Roy, A primer on the Taguchi Method, Van Nostrand
Reinhold, New York, 1990.
A.P. Sage and C.D. Cuppan, On the systems engineering and
management of systems-of-systems and federations of
systems, Inform Knowledge Syst Management 2(4)
(2001), 325–345.
Scotsman, Thirty injured in Philippines ferry bomb attack,
August 29, 2005, http://news.scotsman.com/interna-
tional.cfm?id=1857492005, December 2006. 
G. Taguchi, Off-line and on-line quality control systems, Int
Conf Quality Control, Tokyo, 1978, B4 1–5.
G. Taguchi, Taguchi on robust technology development:
bringing quality engineering upstream, ASME Press, New
York, 1993.
G. Taguchi and S. Konishi, Orthogonal arrays and linear
graphs—tools for quality engineering, American Supplier
Institute, Dearborn, MI, 1987.
G. Taguchi and Y.I. Wu, Introduction to off-line quality con-
trol, Central Japan Control Association, Meieki Nakamura
Ku Nagaya, Japan, 1980.
M. Villanueva, Superferry sinking last february a terrorist
attack, Philippine Headline, News Online, October 12,
2004.
E. Wilson, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Stakehold-
ers, Washington, D.C., July 12, 2004.
R. Young, Baseline study of U.S. port merchant ship traffic
during 2004, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington,
D.C., August 31, 2005.
Dr. Tom Huynh is an Associate Professor of Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, CA. His research interests include uncertainty management in systems engineering, complex
systems and complexity theory, system scaling, simulation-based acquisition, and system-of-systems
engineering methodology. Prior to joining the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Huynh was a Fellow at the
Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center, where he engaged in research in computer network
performance, computer timing control, bandwidth allocation, heuristic algorithms, nonlinear estimation,
perturbation theory, differential equations, and optimization. He was also a lecturer in the Mathematics
Department at San Jose State University. Dr. Huynh obtained simultaneously a B.S. in Chemical
Engineering and a B.A. in Applied Mathematics from UC Berkeley and an M.S. and a Ph.D. in Physics
from UCLA.
258   HUYNH ET AL.
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
Lieutenant Commander Andrew Kessler is an FA-18 Hornet pilot, a Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor, and
a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School for Engineering and Applied
Sciences. While at NPS, he was the student team leader for a group project tasked with developing
architectures of a system of systems to respond to maritime terrorist threats. During his career in the U.S.
Navy, he has served in a number of operational strike fighter squadrons and made numerous deployments
to the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Oceans as well as the Arabian Gulf. He was an instructor
at the Navy TOPGUN School, where he was the subject matter expert on FA-18 radar systems and the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Yale University, an M.S. in International
Relations from Troy State University, and an M.S. in Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California.
Navy Lieutenant Joseph Oravec, a Surface Warfare Officer, was a graduate of the Officer Candidate School
and the Surface Warfare Officer Division Officer Course (with distinction) and a recent graduate of the
Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School for Engineering and Applied Sciences. While at NPS, he
led an effort to analyze the small boat attack for a group project tasked with developing architectures of
a system of systems to respond to maritime terrorist threats. He served as a Fire Control Officer on USS
Stump DD-978 and as a Weapons Officer on USS Whirlwind PC-11. In his next assignment, he will be a
Chief Engineer on USS Harper’s Ferry LSD-49, forward deployed to Sasebo, Japan. Before joining the
Navy, he taught American Government as an adjunct instructor at St. Petersburg College. He holds a B.A.
with a dual major in Political Science & International Affairs (minor in Economics) from Florida State
University, an M.S. in Political Science Education from University of South Florida, and an M.S. in
Systems Engineering & Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Navy Ensign Shaunnah Wark is a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School
for Engineering and Applied Sciences. While at NPS, she earned the award for Most Valuable Team
Member of the 2006 SEA class tasked with developing architectures of a system of systems to respond
to maritime terrorist threats. She graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2005, where
she won the Patriot League Championships in women’s rowing and garnered awards of National
Scholar-Athlete, Patriot-League Scholar-Athlete of the Year for Women’s Crew. She was also named to
the 2005 ESPN Magazine’s Academic All-America Women’s At-Large Third Team. She will serve as a
surface warfare officer on the USS Shoup (DDG 86). She holds a B.S. in Systems Engineering from the
U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. in Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California.
Ms. Jennifer Davis is a systems engineer at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in Pascagoula, Mississippi,
and a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School for Engineering and Applied
Sciences. While at NPS, she led a C4ISR effort for a group project tasked with developing architectures
of a system of systems to respond to maritime terrorist threats. A former U.S. Navy helicopter pilot, Ms.
Davis has worked at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems since 2001, specializing in the ship/aircraft
interface. She holds a B.S. in Ocean Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. in Systems
Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
                                           SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS RESPONDING TO SMALL BOAT ATTACKS  259
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
